“Causing grief to clients” = slapdown by judge; Learn from your neighbor lawyers’ mistakes; attend your clients.

Fee Shifting is no Reason to Mishandle a Case

There are a number of statutes that allow for fee shifting, and we hear calls daily for “tort reform” that pushes that idea.  Here it caused all kinds of bad incentives, as pointed out in a 113 page trial court order on the Fee Petitions under USTA and/or ELA environmental laws. [My experience in front of Judge Goshorn in a few cases is that he is normally a judge who uses few words to make his points – this output is unlike his normal work.]

Judge Goshorn of Wells County was asked to approve fees for the plaintiffs’ lawyer in the amount of $676,986.11. He denied the request, mostly due to the conduct of the plaintiff’s counsel in the handling of the case.  Award to counsel $0. actually less, due to several contempt of court orders.

The judge said many things in 113 pages, none complimentary to Mark E. Shere, the lawyer for the plaintiffs in this case. A few direct slapdowns:

• …Shere caused “untold grief and damage to [his] former clients”… [p.2]
• “has been an impediment, not a facilitator, to the just resolution of this cause.” [p.2]
• “this case has been extraordinarily and needlessly protracted…due to Mr. Shere’s fee agreement with his client.”  [p.3]
• “… Shere drove this case off a cliff, leaving in his wake two bankrupt and divorced clients and a third client in financial trouble with its reputation sullied.” [p.5]

The judge was just getting warmed up.  He continued through 169 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, never letting up on Shere.  On page 96 he found that the Fee Agreement Shere had with his clients violated Rule 1.8(i) of the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct which states:

(i) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:

(1)acquire a lien authorized by law to secure the lawyer’s fee or expenses; and

(2)contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.

Judge Goshorn saw the fee agreement as giving Shere a stake in the case for clients Witt, to his favor and to the favor of co-client Hydrotech. He found that:

• “… the driver of this litigation was recovery of the maximum amount of fees for Mr. Shere, not assisting the Witts.” [p.99]

But this was not a screed against plaintiffs’ lawyers, he gave some fees to lawyers who worked for Shere, ordering the payment to the Clerk, and the clerk to direct the fees to those lawyers. [p.113].

The judge did not feel particularly sorry for the defendants in the case either, denying their petition for fees from Shere or his clients. The Court found:

• “This litigation was a caged grudge match [I like that word-picture offered by the judge] with both sides throwing punches. … The Court is concerned about the chilling effect an award of fees to defendants in a USTA or ELA action might have…” [p.111-2]

Shere gets nothing due to the way he tried the case, putting his interests above those of the client.

This case was also addressed by the Indiana Supreme Court in a March 21, 2012 opinion where Shere and his clients were held in contempt of court.  The Court, in  a 3-2 opinion agreed with the contempt finding, overturning a reversal by the Court of Appeals.

For some reason I suspect we may see another Supreme Court opinion coming out in the future concerning the actions taken by counsel in this case.

****

Learn from your Neighbors*

One lesson that is important is for lawyers to learn from the mistakes of their neighbors. It is one of the reasons this blog exists. Elden Stoops, for example, should have learned from neighboring county lawyer Jeffrey Price‘s 2009 public reprimand.  The cases as described sound surprisingly similar.  Both lawyers filed family law matters, seeking emergency relief.  Both offered proposed Orders to the court granting the emergency relief their clients sought. Neither petition cited or certified the steps made to notify the opposing parties of the filing of the emergency filing, as required under Trial Rule 65(B).  Both courts set hearings and immediately granted the emergency relief. [Query, when can parties, and lawyers, count on judges reading pleadings and knowing the law on such things?]

Later the opposing parties were notified of the actions taken.

Unlike Price, who was charged with one offense, Stoops was charged and sanctioned for two offenses. The one above was for violating Rules 3.5(b) – ex parte communication with a judge; 8.4(d) & (f) conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and assisting a judicial officer in violation of rules of judicial conduct. Stoops second violation was a conflict of interest, when co-clients turned against each other, and he took the case of one of the former co-clients.

Public reprimand for his actions. He had a clean record, and the court accepted the idea that he was trying to protect children, were mitigating factors accepted by the court.

* A lawyer from my firm was involved in the Stoops case.

***

Take Care of the Clients

Ron Weldy has been a frequent poster on the ISBA email discussion lists.  He should have been paying attention to his clients’ matters a bit better.  The Supreme Court recently suspended Weldy for 180 days, 90 to serve and one year probation.  From the six counts, there were issues of fee agreements, client communication, case management, and knowledge of the law were problems for the respondent.  The list of rule problems is lengthy:

Violations: The parties agree that Respondent violated these Indiana Professional Conduct Rules prohibiting the following misconduct:

1.2(a): Failure to abide by a client’s decision concerning the objectives of representation.

1.3: Failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness.

1.4(a)(3): Failure to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter.

1.4(a)(4): Failure to comply promptly with a client’s reasonable requests for information.

1.4(b): Failure to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit a client to make informed decisions.

1.5(b): Failure to communicate the basis or rate of the fee for which a client will be responsible before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation.

1.5(c): Failure to disclose to a client the method by which a contingent legal fee will be determined.

1.7(a)(2): Representing a client when the representation may be materially limited by the attorney’s own self-interest.

1.15(e): Failure to properly secure disputed property until the dispute is resolved.

1.16(a)(3): Continuing representation of a client after the lawyer is discharged.

3.1: Asserting a position for which there is no non-frivolous basis in law or fact.

3.2: Failure to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of a client.

3.3(a)(1): Knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal.

8.4(c): Engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.

8.4(d): Engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.

This case is a good one to review before taking a weekend off.  Stay diligent, read the law. Be careful with your fee agreements

Advertisement

Corporate Lawyers have Troubles too; E-Discovery Issues; Reimbursements?

Corporate lawyers don’t get too much discipline press

Sometimes they deserve it, so they too, can stay off the radar of LawyersWithTroubles.

Ky. lawyer Ronald Hines was a corporate lawyer with Cody Properties, Inc.  He worked there for years, Cody was the employer.  Then trouble brewed in the corporate boardroom, and Hines took a side with one faction.  In fact he filed a suit against some of the corporate officers, without the Board’s approval, and expressed his opinion that the Board was not properly elected.  But he did not do it within the chain of command, or under the Rules of Professional Conduct.

He turned corporate files over to dissident shareholders, and objected to the LLC’s organizing papers that he had drafted to create the entity, calling them “fraudulent.”  He got fired by the new management, but still continued to hold himself out as “counsel for the corporation.”

The Kentucky Supreme Court found violations or Rule 1.7 – Conflict of Interests, 1.13(a) – Duty of Loyalty with Organizational Clients, 1.4(a) Failure to Communicate with Client (the new officers he was fired by), 1.16 Duties  Upon Termination of Representation, and 1.8 Duty of Confidentiality of Client Information.

The Court suspended Hines for 120 days for this series of violations.  KY does not report the process of reinstatement in this Order.

******

“I [heart] hot moms”

One thing about technology is the great evidence that is contained there. Clients do dumb things, and tell the world.  Lawyers who help them “clean up the record” are doing even dumber (and more expensive) things as Virginia lawyer Matt Murray found out.

Fortunately for the client the VA Supreme Court upheld the $8.5M wrongful death verdict coming out of the tragic case, but Murray got tagged for a $542,000 legal fee sanction for advising the client to “clean up the Facebook pages” where, among other things, the deceased woman’s husband and plaintiff had a photo showing himself in a T-shirt that read “I love hot moms.”  Murray thought that might hurt the case, so he had a paralegal instruct the husband to remove that photo, 15 others and some text.  Because the husband had previously communicated with the adjuster through Facebook, the defendants knew of  the materials.

Murray has been reported to DC for abusing the Rules of Professional Conduct, and is now under investigation. He is no longer actively practicing law.

Another article on this case by Sharon Nelson: http://tinyurl.com/l586f5k

***

Reimbursements — I  need an expense for that?

BIGLAW lawyers live in a different world.  One thought nothing of seeking $69,000 in reimbursements for cab fare, but forgot to first incur the $69,000 in fares.  Lee Smolen, of the Chicago office of Chicago’s biggest law firm Sidley & Austin, not only got his cab fares paid, but also $50,000 in entertainment expenses “not incurred for legitimate firm purposes.”

Apparently the partners at S&A did not see the humor, fired him and submitted the theft to the IL disciplinary authorities.

But it did not faze his new firm, DLA Piper, with law offices in Chicago and around the world.  It said that Lee had “learned from his experience” and will be a productive member of their team.

H/T John Conlon

When you, a lawyer, are in trouble, hire a competent lawyer; NY Times on Billing Troubles Abound with Fraud Allegation; More on Fee issues – what is a “document review” billing entry worth?

Can you believe this guy is [might once again be] a lawyer?

It is reportedly a heart stopping moment, you get a certified letter from the Disciplinary Commission inviting you to explain some complaint made against you.  It has to be even more disconcerting when the Commission files, and serves you with its Verified Complaint; now you are past the informal opportunity to solve the problem.

The Best Practice is to hire a competent lawyer to help you at the first letter, but if you don’t, then hire one at the complaint stage – you failed to get yourself off, get help.

Before you go to lunch, find someone, call and set an appointment. Do not go out for the afternoon golf game.  Save your license.

Jeffery Fetters had even been through the process before. In 2012 he started down a path he had previously walked in 2005.  This time he did not read the A&D Rules that govern the disciplinary process.  He misfiled his answer to the complaint. The misfiled answer did not meet the standards for an answer to a complaint. He apparently took the whole process lightly.

Just like he took the duty of effectively representing his client in the eviction process. He won the immediate eviction hearing, but did nothing after that, and eventually refused to talk to the client about the problems.

The court found the following violations:

The Court finds that Respondent violated these Indiana Professional Conduct Rules prohibiting the following misconduct:

1.2(a): Failure to abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation.

1.3: Failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness.

1.4(a)(3): Failure to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter.

1.4(b): Failure to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit a client to make informed decisions.

8.1(a): Knowingly making a false statement of material fact to the Disciplinary Commission in connection with a disciplinary matter.

Lots of failures there, and no effective way to answer the allegations because he did not follow the rules, or hire a competent lawyer to assist him.
What do you think the Court did? Answer is below.

DLA Piper in More Trouble

In March, I reported the biggest of the BIGLAW firms that may have gotten caught engaging in serious bill padding. And this was a billing problem of the magnitude of a $200,000 over-estimate, and it was as much as $675,000 in dispute. The NY Times article updating us on the value of the dispute now is here.

One rule of being a smart lawyer is to be real careful before deciding to “sue a client for fees.”  It is on many of the “do not ever do this” lists right before “fool around with the staff, nobody will ever know,” and after “what is a small loan from the trust account going to hurt.”  There are a lot of reasons, not to sue a client, and I will mention a couple illustrated by this case:

1 – you already created a litigation tiger and now you grabbed him by the tail.  Clients going through a lawsuit are often seriously ticked off, and to then be sued by your lawyers, the people you put your trust in, really gets under most clients’ skin.

2 – if you sue your client, be sure that you don’t have a smoking gun in the file, or on the computer. That means you don’t have anything that suggests, let alone shows that you were padding the bill or committing malpractice or ethical violations, or anything else, anywhere in a letter, an email, an interoffice communication, or on a scratch pad. Discovery is getting good.

If you think your client owes you $675K, then the client probably has the resources to spend another $500K searching your database.

Another reason to use a smaller firm?

The Times quotes a “billing ethics professor” (I did not know we have ethics professors who specialize in billing matters – but now know why we do) in this paragraph:

In a survey of about 250 lawyers that Professor Ross conducted in 2007, more than half acknowledged that the prospect of billing extra time influenced their decision to perform pointless assignments, such as doing excessive legal research or extraneous document review. There is also the issue of “featherbedding,” he said, or throwing armies of bodies at every problem.

When your law firm does not have “armies of bodies” hanging around looking for something to do, the “featherbedding” issue is mooted to a great extent.  And when your lawyer or small team of lawyers, that you know by name, are working on your matter, the thought of performing “pointless assignments” is not near as tempting as it might be if you are teaching a large class of first year lawyers the ways of research or the firm’s ethics of billing.

The most recent news in the case?

His [Victor’s] lawyer, Larry Hutcher at Davidoff Hutcher & Citron, amended the countersuit last week to include a fraud claim and a request for $22.5 million in punitive damages, a number representing 1 percent of DLA Piper’s reported revenue last year. (my emphasis)

***

The other end of the Canada case.

Last week we discussed the Canada case, where the fees, though flat, were earned, and upon the client’s demand did not need to be returned.  Octavia Snulligan did not understand that rule before Canada was decided.

She too requested a flat fee, but did not appear to do the work required, or at least she could not satisfy the client that she was doing the work that was expected.  After five months she was fired, and the client wanted part of her retainer money back. Snulligan refused, and when she was asked for an invoice, she crafted one. She, like many lawyers do not keep time sheets, but she created one anyway, and showed 37.8 hours of work, in 32 entries.  28 of the entries were for “Document Review” without further explanation. The hearing officer, the commission and the Supreme Court were all unimpressed with the reconstructed time records.

So unimpressed that it was the most serious aggravating factor found. It was “calculated to mislead the Family, the Commission and the Hearing Officer” said the Supreme Court.

Snulligan got a retainer of $6,000 on a flat fee of $12,000. She had the case for five months and said she had worked it. The court said she failed to refund the unearned portion, which the hearing officer calculated as $5,000 in unearned fees of the $6,000 she had received.

The court goes out of its way to say that a “$12,000 total fee, or her collection of $6,000 of that fee before she was terminated would [not] have been unreasonable” if she had been able to complete the representation. But she did not, she was discharged and had not met the Realtor’s Rule of getting to the close before getting fired by the client.

Another good discussion on fee issues by the court, helping the bar to better understand where the line of good behavior ends before you get into bad behavior.

What do you think the Court did? Answer is below.

***

Fetters got Six month suspension without automatic reinstatement [follow link to find out about automatic reinstatement], with a requirement for restitution for reinstatement.

Snulligan got a 30 day suspension without automatic reinstatement, but with a proviso that if she refunds the $5,000 in overcharged fees, she may petition for immediate reinstatement.

IN Re: Kendall Redux

Kendall – Redux

The 2004 case of In Re Michael Kendall (see 3-24-04 entry) is a landmark case among Indiana’s legal fee cases.

Kendall’s law firm went bankrupt, and several clients’ fees could not be refunded, having been deposited into his general account. The issue was whether those funds should have been safe in a trust account. In a 13 page opinion. the Supreme Court expounded on the proper use of “flat fees” “non-refundable retainers” and how lawyers can protect their livelihoods.

The hearing officer had found violations of Rule 1.4 on communicating with clients, but on the big fee issues, Rules 1.5 & 1.15, found no violation.  The Disciplinary Commission appealed those findings, and the Supreme Court found there were violations of Rules 1.5, & 1.15. The court distinguished Kendall’s actions from those found in the In the Matter of Stanton case, when flat fees for criminal matters, deposited in the lawyer’s general account was permissible. Kendall deposited advance fees for hourly work in the lawyer’s general account.

FLAT FEES

The court’s discussion starts with a helpful paragraph:  Advance fee payments are subject to different requirements, depending upon the terms of the agreement between the lawyer and the client.  This discussion will distinguish between the advance fees charged by the respondent here (that were to be earned in the future at an agreed rate) and advance fees that are agreed to cover specific legal services regardless of length or complexity (fixed or “flat” fees). 

After the discussion the Court held: “We therefore hold that Prof. Cond. R. 1.15(a) generally requires the segregation of advance payments of attorney fees, as discussed below….  Except in the case of flat fees governed by Stanton, a lawyer’s failure to place advance payments of attorney fees in a separate account violates this rule.”

The per curiam opinion, authored by now Chief Justice Dickson, defined a “flat fee” that could be charged, and once collected placed in the firm’s general account, as follows: “As distinguished from a partial initial payment to be applied to fees for future legal services, a flat fee is a fixed fee that an attorney charges for all legal services in a particular matter, or for a particular discrete component of legal services.”

Are you paying attention reader? Flat fees can be charged and put in the general office account.  But they must qualify as flat fees.  And you must explain, accurately, how that works, so the client is not misled.

UNREASONABLE FEES = NON-REFUNDABLE RETAINERS?

Kendall’s other mistake was to use language in his fee agreement that must have been common (considering how often the issue arises), a provision that fees paid were non-refundable unless otherwise provided by law.  That language is a huge red-flag, and while the Supreme Court has not yet said the term “non-refundable retainer” is forbidden, they have not approved it in recent history when addressing the situation.  In Kendall they held that even though the Commission never proved he had taken and kept a non-refundable retainer, and never failed to resolve a retainer when he was discharged before the completion of the case, the Court  still found the fee agreement that included a threat that the fees paid could not be refunded was unreasonable and in violation of Rule 1.5.

In language that I still find confusing, the court said the following two things: 1) “In discussing [in Thonert] the nonrefundability provision, we observed: We do not hold that unrefundable retainers are per se unenforceable.  There are many circumstances where, for example, preclusion of other representations or guaranteed priority of access to an attorney’s advice may justify such an arrangement.  But here there is no evidence of, for example, any value received by the client or detriment incurred by the attorney in return for the nonrefundable provision, other than relatively routine legal services.  [Thonert] 682 N.E.2d at 524.  Where a retainer is thus justified, a lawyer would be well advised to explicitly include the basis for such non-refundability in the attorney-client agreement; and 2) We hold that the assertion in an attorney fee agreement that such advance payment is nonrefundable violates the requirement  of Prof. Cond. R. 1.5(a) that a lawyer’s fee “shall be reasonable.”

How clear is that? The non-refundable retainer fee may be permissible, but to say so in the fee agreement violates the reasonable fees requirement.

Word that part of your fee agreement carefully, yet make it clear for the average client.

And remember, even though the Court did not say it out loud, no fee is Non-Refundable.

CONCLUSION

Michael C. Kendall, in the face of other undisclosed charges recently filed by the Disciplinary Commission, tendered his resignation of his license to practice law. On Jan. 28, 2013 the Supreme Court accepted his resignation, and said that he may not apply for reinstatement for at least five years.

I don’t know Michael C. Kendall, but the 2004 opinion included the following paragraph: The hearing officer received significant evidence of Kendall’s professional reputation.  Several highly respected witnesses testified favorably for Kendall, praising his history of ethical practice, his integrity, his significant public service, and his strong dedication, care, and commitment to his clients’ cases.  The hearing officer recognized that Kendall “deserves sanction” but noted that the “accolades from the various witnesses were impressive and unchallenged,” and urged that “the penalty needs to be tempered by what seems to be the Respondent’s superior ethical history until this recent period.”  Findings at 23. 

A few years ago a friend of mine had some troubles, and got a reprimand. Folks tried to help, but a second round of complaints hit. He resigned his license to practice as a lawyer. It was right for him. I hope this was right for Kendall.