Will Lawyers get in trouble blowing smoke?; Be careful what you share with an Inmate; 3-2 vote on an Agreed Discipline – what does that mean?

Good to see a Bar Association help out the member lawyers on difficult ethics issues. The King Co. Bar Assoc. in Washington State has asked for guidance from the State Supreme Court on how to handle a conflict in the drug laws. Marijuana use will soon be legal under WA state law, but the federal law has not changed. So is it unethical for a state licensed attorney to use dope? Is it unethical to advise companies on how to comply with the state law on selling dope?

There are other issues where state law and federal law are at odds in various states. Voting rights issues come up, gun possession issues, campaign finance, and abortion laws.  Are lawyers at risk for following state laws, and not federal laws?  Will drug laws be different?

Wait and see.

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When will lawyers learn to be careful when visiting inmates?

Lake County lawyer Carl Jones should have followed the rules about sharing information with a jailed client.  He could have sent the inmate’s girlfriend’s letter through the mail, but it would probably be read, and her promise to lie for the inmate at trial would have been found.

More importantly, he could have told the Disciplinary Commission the truth about the matter when first asked.  When he was later testifying he told a different story, and for that he got a suspension for six months, without automatic reinstatement.

Lawyers interactions with inmates are constitutionally protected, up to a point. The inmate is entitled to private conferences so that a legitimate defense can be presented to the court.  But because we have special privileges, we must be extra careful to follow the rules.  Jones is the second lawyer this year to get disciplined for an improper interaction with a prisoner-client.  Earlier this year this blog reported this story.A Google search found: “About 66,000 results (0.31 seconds)”  to that lawyer’s name – most for this event.

Be careful out there, or more especially, when you are visiting someone in there!

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Value of a Conditional Agreement for Discipline

Plea bargains are a way of life for criminal defense lawyers, and negotiated settlements are the rule for civil litigators, it makes sense to try to work out a disciplinary matter as well.  At least today, that is.

In the Matter of Noah Holcomb, Jr. is a case on point.  Holcomb’s opinion shows that he violated several pretty important rules, 1.15 (3 subsections as different violations) on safekeeping of client funds, commingling client and attorney funds; 8.4 fraudulent conduct (hiding cash from the IRS); 1.5 setting and honoring fee agreements, not charging unreasonable fees, 8.4 conversion, and four different A&D Rules on handling trust accounts.  In addition he neglected client files (Rule 1.3).

By the time the matter got to the Supreme Court he still had not made restitution, but — he had cooperated with the Disc. Comm.

The Court starts its discussion with the following:  “This Court has disbarred attorneys who committed the type of misconduct to which Respondent has admitted.”  The important part is next: “The discipline the Court would impose might have been more severe than proposed by the parties had this matter been submitted without the Commission’s agreement.”

Now the agreement did not result in a slap on the wrist – Holcomb got a three-year suspension, without automatic reinstatement – and the  strong language of warning that reinstatement could be hard to come by:

We note, however, that regardless of the date on which Respondent is eligible to petition for reinstatement, reinstatement is discretionary and requires clear and convincing evidence of the attorney’s remorse, rehabilitation, and fitness to practice law. See Admis. Disc. R. 23(4)(b). Moreover, the parties agree that restitution should be a condition for Respondent’s reinstatement. 

The vote to approve the outcome was an unusual 3-2 with Justices David and Rush dissenting with the comment: “believing the Respondent should be disbarred.”

It sounds unlikely that Holcomb will return to the practice, but he might. After reading the opinion, you might wonder, as I do, if we want him back in the profession.

Did the Commission go too light on Holcomb in order to get an agreement, and if so, why? Apparently three justices accepted the reason (assuming it was explained somewhere), although they did not include the reason in their rationale.  Will they accept that next time?  Is this opinion a shot across the Commission’s bow?

Or is it a shot across the bow of those attorneys who stand their ground?

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Hiding Things Brings Trouble: Assets, Evidence and a Court Order.

Hiding Assets

The case started for Washington State lawyer, Thomas McGrath when his wife, a chiropractor, started a fight with her ex-employee.  Forbes reports on his bad actions: first to represent his wife in a case where she lost a judgment of $500,000; and then to do improper asset protection in violation of the RPC.

Shifting assets when the case is going badly is a time honored tactic, but shifting a spouse’s asset through the office trust account in violation of Rule 1.15 is still a forbidden mixture of personal assets with clients’ assets.

Filing bankruptcy is not generally improper, but falsifying the Bankruptcy Petition is a federal felony and an ethical violation.

As Jay Atkisson, the Forbes columnist explains: “This case has nothing to do with legitimate asset protection planning, and everything to do with plain old fraud on creditors.”

What do you think the Washington State Supreme Court did to the husband lawyer, just trying to help his wife?

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Hiding Evidence on Facebook:

Matthew Murray was slow to advise his client about the eternal nature of electronic evidence. Murray’s client lost his wife and filed a wrongful death case.  Among the damages claimed was loss of love, affection and companionship.  After being asked to produce “screenshots” from his client’s Facebook account, Murray told his paralegal to make sure the account had been “cleaned up. ” The plaintiff-client’s photos disappeared from his Facebook wall, but the defense counsel already had 16 of them, including the one that showed him wearing a T-shirt that said “I ♥ hot moms” while holding a beer, soon after the wife’s death.  Since the suit was for the losses he suffered due to the wrongful death of the plaintiff’s wife as caused by the defendant, the photo was thought to be material to damages.

First, the trial court ordered the payment of defendant’s attorney fees against Murray and his client in the amount of $722,000 and slashed the jury’s $8.5M verdict. The VA Supreme Court reinstated the verdict, but allowed the attorney fees order to stand.

It also found Murray violated the RPC and entered a sanction: What would you have ordered?

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Hiding the Court Order?

A busy time for the Washington State Disciplinary Board.
And Tom Kamb was a busy lawyer. He had a criminal law practice, mostly DUI defense work. On the day of the problem, he had 20 case hearings set in the morning.  He got a plea on one case, which was submitted, and approved by the court.  He forgot to get the breath test suppressed, which appears to be a normal event, since suppression of the breath test protects the client’s driver’s license.

Kamb later had a hearing with the Dept. of Licensing’s ALJ about his client’s driver’s license, Kamb reported that he had gotten the breath test suppressed in the criminal charge.  Now he had to find a way to prove that.  Bad idea.  He asked for the closed file from the clerk, and penciled a note about the test being suppressed on the signed order. The now suspicious clerk refused to provide him with a certified copy of the newly forged order, and sent him to the prosecutor.  The prosecutor agreed to a retroactive suppression, not knowing that Kamb had lied to the DOL’s ALJ, and forged the court’s order.  When Kamb returned with the note from the prosecutor, the clerk sent him to the presiding judge who was not pleased.

The judge files disciplinary charges, and after the investigation by bar counsel, there was a finding of Kamb’s guilt on three counts:

Count 1 charge[d] Kamb with misrepresenting the existence of an order suppressing his client’s breath test to the hearing officer in violation of RPC

3.3(a)(1). Count 2 charge[d] Kamb with changing Judge Svaren’s order in violation of RPC 8.4(b ), 8.4( c), and 8.4( d). Count 3 charge[d] Kamb with violating RPC 1.3 which  requires a lawyer to act diligently and promptly, by failing to discuss suppression of the breath test with [prosecutor] Johnson before the DOL hearing.

Kamb challenged the Hearing Officer’s findings. The court found his version of facts lacked credibility.  The transcript of the ALJ’s hearing proved the timeline and his misstatement of facts about the existence of a court order that helped his client.

What did the WA Supreme Court do in this case?

Poll Results:

1. Washington Supreme Court disbarred the lawyer after 40+ years of practice – citing the filing of false filings and claims, and lack of remorse.

2. Murray got a five-year suspension from the practice of law.

3. The opinion cites as authority: “The American Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991 & Supp. 1992)” as the guide for lawyer discipline in Washington State.   Kamb got disbarred.

Telling the Client’s Story; Drinking, Twice?; Calculated Fraud?

Must be Tempting

To know a juicy story, with sex, politics, and prominent people, and be forbidden to tell, is tough.  It is such a temptation that the authorities wrote a rule especially for lawyers, to threaten us not to reveal confidential information.  But Karl Rove is also a tempting target.  And there is money in writing books, so they say.

It is tough to deal with one temptation, but two, or three all at the same time?  Joseph Stork Smith, of Carmel, IN, did not handle the pressure well, apparently.  He decided to write the book, name the names, and tell the sordid stories that he got from his legal client. Some have speculated on who the client is, but the Indiana Supreme Court in its Order did not name her.  I respect that. And having read the opinion, it is pretty juicy writing for a per curiam decision.

Smith got a disbarment. End of the line for him.  Started practice in 1976, so early he is in his early 60s most likely.  Succumbed to temptations.

Maybe if he had not subtitled the book “Machiavelli’s Sexy Twin Sister”….

Once ought to be enough.

Allen County, IN Public Defender Mitchell Hicks, has seen the twice drunken arrestee too many times in the practice, he has to know better, but….“I screwed up,” he said.

A fight with a former client outside a bar… an unregistered gun… trouble. Arrested for a second alcohol offense, he took it like an adult (unlike so many defendants). Sentencing was as follows:

[Judge Fran] Gull ordered Hicks to serve 60 days at the Allen County Jail on the drunken driving charge but suspended 50 days of that sentence. She ordered him to serve 365 days on the charge of carrying a handgun without a license but suspended 275 days.

She then said he could serve his time in the county community corrections program and that his [driver’s] license will be suspended for 180 days.

100 days of home detention. No Disciplinary Action by the Indiana Supreme Court, yet.

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Biglaw lawyers ought to know!

Some firm names just ring out as BIGLAW, and among the biggest is Baker & McKinzie.  Biglaw firms have lots of people around, and they suggest that lots of people provide good protection for their clients. When you get billed for 10 lawyers work on your business matter, you should have especially good protection from the harms that some solo or other errant lawyer might commit.

Not in the case of Martin Weisberg!  He was sentenced to two years for committing “a calculate fraud and lies” to steal $1.3M from his securities clients.

The scheme was to put $30M of client’s money into a “trust account,” but he did not tell the clients that it was earning interest.  Lawyers use interest free or IOLTA trust accounts for handling small amounts of money for clients, if the interest that would be earned is not worth the time to set up the account.  The Rules co permit the earned interest be used for public purposes, instead of simply going to the bank. But when the amounts involved make it worth the time to open an interest earning trust account, the lawyer must do that.  Weinberg put $1.3M earned interest in his pocket.  That violates lots of laws, and lawyer rules.  He got caught. The Sentencing Order included:

 [T]wo years in prison,… three years of supervised release, 1,000 hours of community service, a $297,500 restitution order and a $250,000 forfeiture.

I always wonder why if the finding is $1.3M in losses, the restitution and forfeiture together do not equal at least $1.3M – plus interest.

“Causing grief to clients” = slapdown by judge; Learn from your neighbor lawyers’ mistakes; attend your clients.

Fee Shifting is no Reason to Mishandle a Case

There are a number of statutes that allow for fee shifting, and we hear calls daily for “tort reform” that pushes that idea.  Here it caused all kinds of bad incentives, as pointed out in a 113 page trial court order on the Fee Petitions under USTA and/or ELA environmental laws. [My experience in front of Judge Goshorn in a few cases is that he is normally a judge who uses few words to make his points – this output is unlike his normal work.]

Judge Goshorn of Wells County was asked to approve fees for the plaintiffs’ lawyer in the amount of $676,986.11. He denied the request, mostly due to the conduct of the plaintiff’s counsel in the handling of the case.  Award to counsel $0. actually less, due to several contempt of court orders.

The judge said many things in 113 pages, none complimentary to Mark E. Shere, the lawyer for the plaintiffs in this case. A few direct slapdowns:

• …Shere caused “untold grief and damage to [his] former clients”… [p.2]
• “has been an impediment, not a facilitator, to the just resolution of this cause.” [p.2]
• “this case has been extraordinarily and needlessly protracted…due to Mr. Shere’s fee agreement with his client.”  [p.3]
• “… Shere drove this case off a cliff, leaving in his wake two bankrupt and divorced clients and a third client in financial trouble with its reputation sullied.” [p.5]

The judge was just getting warmed up.  He continued through 169 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, never letting up on Shere.  On page 96 he found that the Fee Agreement Shere had with his clients violated Rule 1.8(i) of the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct which states:

(i) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:

(1)acquire a lien authorized by law to secure the lawyer’s fee or expenses; and

(2)contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.

Judge Goshorn saw the fee agreement as giving Shere a stake in the case for clients Witt, to his favor and to the favor of co-client Hydrotech. He found that:

• “… the driver of this litigation was recovery of the maximum amount of fees for Mr. Shere, not assisting the Witts.” [p.99]

But this was not a screed against plaintiffs’ lawyers, he gave some fees to lawyers who worked for Shere, ordering the payment to the Clerk, and the clerk to direct the fees to those lawyers. [p.113].

The judge did not feel particularly sorry for the defendants in the case either, denying their petition for fees from Shere or his clients. The Court found:

• “This litigation was a caged grudge match [I like that word-picture offered by the judge] with both sides throwing punches. … The Court is concerned about the chilling effect an award of fees to defendants in a USTA or ELA action might have…” [p.111-2]

Shere gets nothing due to the way he tried the case, putting his interests above those of the client.

This case was also addressed by the Indiana Supreme Court in a March 21, 2012 opinion where Shere and his clients were held in contempt of court.  The Court, in  a 3-2 opinion agreed with the contempt finding, overturning a reversal by the Court of Appeals.

For some reason I suspect we may see another Supreme Court opinion coming out in the future concerning the actions taken by counsel in this case.

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Learn from your Neighbors*

One lesson that is important is for lawyers to learn from the mistakes of their neighbors. It is one of the reasons this blog exists. Elden Stoops, for example, should have learned from neighboring county lawyer Jeffrey Price‘s 2009 public reprimand.  The cases as described sound surprisingly similar.  Both lawyers filed family law matters, seeking emergency relief.  Both offered proposed Orders to the court granting the emergency relief their clients sought. Neither petition cited or certified the steps made to notify the opposing parties of the filing of the emergency filing, as required under Trial Rule 65(B).  Both courts set hearings and immediately granted the emergency relief. [Query, when can parties, and lawyers, count on judges reading pleadings and knowing the law on such things?]

Later the opposing parties were notified of the actions taken.

Unlike Price, who was charged with one offense, Stoops was charged and sanctioned for two offenses. The one above was for violating Rules 3.5(b) – ex parte communication with a judge; 8.4(d) & (f) conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and assisting a judicial officer in violation of rules of judicial conduct. Stoops second violation was a conflict of interest, when co-clients turned against each other, and he took the case of one of the former co-clients.

Public reprimand for his actions. He had a clean record, and the court accepted the idea that he was trying to protect children, were mitigating factors accepted by the court.

* A lawyer from my firm was involved in the Stoops case.

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Take Care of the Clients

Ron Weldy has been a frequent poster on the ISBA email discussion lists.  He should have been paying attention to his clients’ matters a bit better.  The Supreme Court recently suspended Weldy for 180 days, 90 to serve and one year probation.  From the six counts, there were issues of fee agreements, client communication, case management, and knowledge of the law were problems for the respondent.  The list of rule problems is lengthy:

Violations: The parties agree that Respondent violated these Indiana Professional Conduct Rules prohibiting the following misconduct:

1.2(a): Failure to abide by a client’s decision concerning the objectives of representation.

1.3: Failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness.

1.4(a)(3): Failure to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter.

1.4(a)(4): Failure to comply promptly with a client’s reasonable requests for information.

1.4(b): Failure to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit a client to make informed decisions.

1.5(b): Failure to communicate the basis or rate of the fee for which a client will be responsible before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation.

1.5(c): Failure to disclose to a client the method by which a contingent legal fee will be determined.

1.7(a)(2): Representing a client when the representation may be materially limited by the attorney’s own self-interest.

1.15(e): Failure to properly secure disputed property until the dispute is resolved.

1.16(a)(3): Continuing representation of a client after the lawyer is discharged.

3.1: Asserting a position for which there is no non-frivolous basis in law or fact.

3.2: Failure to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of a client.

3.3(a)(1): Knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal.

8.4(c): Engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.

8.4(d): Engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.

This case is a good one to review before taking a weekend off.  Stay diligent, read the law. Be careful with your fee agreements

Report the Claim; Trust Account Abuse

Lawyer Messed Up Deal, Better Report

Koransky Bouwer & Poracky P.C. had an associate mess up. It ended up in Federal Court, then the 7th Cir. <here>.  Lots to put on the back of an associate.

The young associate filed a signed contract rather than send it to the parties as evidence that the deal was completed. The party not represented by the firm withdrew its acceptance before delivery of the contract to all parties, black letter law allows that. Client is justifiably upset.

While this is going on, the law firm that the associate works for, Koransky & Bouwer, renews its malpractice coverage with The Bar Plan, its professional liability carrier. In the process, there is a question that reads something like “are there any claims or potential claims in existence, now or before we renew?”  Firm, which knew about this problem, with one of the name partners being involved in the matter, said “no problem” [or words to that effect].

Client, not happy to have lost the contract sues the firm, who turns the complaint over to the PLP company.  It says something like “wait, from these dates and all, it appears you knew of this claim when you renewed your insurance, and you did not tell us.” Another black letter issue in the law is that a misstatement in an insurance application will void the application. So the Bar Plan says: “We have no duty to defend or pay for the claim!” K&B filed for declaratory judgment on that issue in ND Ind. federal court, the trial court said “sorry law firm, no coverage.” The 7th Circuit agreed.
Lesson? The quick response application often found in policy renewals is not your friend. Your duty to disclose still exists. Does that mean you must report every disgruntled client who might conceivably file a claim? This blog does not offer legal advice, but I recommend you read the underlying policy about when you need to submit a timely claim.

One lawyer has suggested that the insurance company should be required to show that it was prejudiced by the delay in the notice, but that is not the current state of the law, in this Circuit.

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Watch the Trust Account

Edguardo Martinez Suarez is a Hamilton County lawyer, with a pattern of trust account problems. In 2006 he bounced a trust account check, which automatically brought the Disciplinary Commission in via the rule of mandatory reporting of bounced trust checks by a bank holding an IOLTA account. Suarez said “it is a mistake” but could not show how the mistake occurred. In 2009 the Commission demanded a CPA audit of the account, but the CPA reported there was a lack of documents to allow for an audit.

With that, the Commission started an in-house audit. The Supreme Court characterized the findings as many “violations, which took place from 2006 through 2012, includ[ing] at least six instances of paying personal and business expenses from the trust account, 55 instances of disbursing funds in excess of the amount held in trust for each corresponding client, and making 14 cash withdrawals.”

Then to compound problems he committed another violation, keeping more than “a nominal balance of” personal funds commingled to protect the account. But the court, in reviewing the Agreed Stipulation with Suarez, found three good things: no prior discipline history; no selfish motive on Suarez’s part; and, no client lost any funds from his violations.

The parties agreed to a 60 day suspension, stayed with two years probation. For two years he must: 1) maintain his trust account in accordance with the Disciplinary Commission’s 51 page white paper on Trust Account Management: Handling Client and Third Party Funds most recently updated in March 2012; 2) Have the Trust Account monitored by a CPA approved by the Commission, and have quarterly reports made to the Commission; and, 3) Agree that a violation of probation will cause the 60 day suspension to go into effect, and there will be no automatic reinstatement after the suspension. Finally, at the end of probation Suarez will be required to petition for dismissal of the probation. Somehow he was not ordered into the CLE on trust account management.

Seems like an appropriate disposition, as no clients were harmed by the mistakes. Management of the trust account is one of the most critical skills an attorney with trust account duties must have. Failure there is a ticket to Discipline World, and it is tough to get out with your skin intact.

There are CLE courses on Trust Account management, the DC staff often are speakers. Indiana’s Solo and Small Firm Conference has done sessions on this in 2004 and 2007, and likely will do more. ISBA-CLE and ICLEF do sessions annually. A great book is out there by one of the ABA’s most successful writers, Jay Foonberg titled “The ABA Guide to Lawyer Trust Accounts” (my version is dated 1996.)

Protect yourself and your clients and your license. Review Rule 1.15 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and Admission & Discipline Rule 23 Sec. 29-30, and Overdraft Rule 2.

Neglect gets 3 years; Lawyer arrested for fraud?; Report your Sex Offender Client? NY says no!

There must have been neglect, statement of proof in the opinion would be nice.

Louis Denney eventually had four DI cases filed, one for each year of 2008, 2009, 2010, and finally one in 2011 that did him in. Unfortunately the Order reads more like a CCS entry, so it is hard to tell what all Denney did. We are told that the Hearing Officer, Judge Jeff Todd issued a 56 page report, Denney appealed and was heard by the Supreme Court, and the court adopted that Report, but we just get a snippet of info on Counts 2,5,7 and 9. The court found violations of Rules 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4(a) & (b), 1.5(a), 1.15(d), 1.16(a)(3) & (d), 3.1, 3.2, 3.4(c), 4.4(a), 5.4(a), 8.1(b) and 8.4(b).  Denney was a busy guy, and apparently  neglected many of his cases. He did fight the allegations and the Hearing Officer report, but the final order does not offer many details.

There is no link to the 56 page report, so what we know is that Denney: charged unreasonable fees, neglected client cases, failed to do the work for which he was hired, failed to communicate, refused to return unearned fees, disobeyed court orders for accountings, and made scandalous and irrelevant accusations against a judge when the judge refused a continuance, in an attempt to remove the judge from the case.

As a result he is suspended from the practice for three years without automatic reinstatement, and we know  that Justice Rucker would have approved a one year suspension, and Justice David would have disbarred Denney.

What we don’t know that would be educational for lawyers who review disciplinary matters is: How many total counts were found against the respondent; were any counts found for the respondent; what time frame was Denney committing violations, and did he continue to violate the duty to clients after the 2008 complaint (which resulted from his failure to respond to grievance), and was the 2008 issue (or the ’09 or ’10 issues) wrapped into the 2011 matters? Were any clients made whole during this matter or will the ISBA’s Client’s Financial Assistance Fund be involved, if the clients are aware of this benefit?

I imagine writing disciplinary opinions is difficult, but we could learn more if more information and judicial reasoning was put on display in the opinions that are issued. Especially after a well fought hearing.

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Lawyer Arrested for Benefits Fraud…

Shawn Donahue pleaded not guilty to fraud in Harrison County recently.  The Louisville Courier Journal’s story called it welfare fraud, but it appears to be unemployment compensation benefits at issue.

The allegations are that Donahue received UE benefits while still working for a couple local entities that were paying him for legal work. It is alleged that he failed to disclose the earnings. Donahue’s lawyer, Bart Betteau predicted that his client would be cleared of the charges.

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NY Opinion, Lawyer not required to Report Inaccurate reports by Sex Offender

Legal services lawyer is contacted by potential client PC, who is a registered sex offender.  Lawyer is asked to review an administrative filing, made under penalty of perjury, to a state agency. She does, and in confirming the information submitted determines that the allegation of being a felon is inadequate, because pc did not disclose the sex offender status of Level Three Rapist, and pc did not register as required by law, under his properly spelled name.  PC  did not appear for appointment, so Agency decided not to represent him further, but did not report the evidence it found to the agency.

Should lawyer have reported the findings to the state agency? NY Ethics Committee says No! (see Opinion 963) Rules of Professional Conduct # 1.6 deals with confidentiality of client communications, and if PC had not become a client, Rule 1.18 carries duties to prospective clients. The rub is that Rule 3.3 “Conduct before a Tribunal” puts duties to disclose confidential information on lawyers, if the situation meets the standards. Here it is a close call, but since the lawyer did not appear before the tribunal, but only reviewed information submitted to it, and the submission was not by the lawyer, the committee finds that “It would not make sense to require a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures regarding proceedings before a tribunal in which the lawyer has never appeared on behalf of the client.”

But does the lawyer have to report the failure to register properly with the police?  Rule 1.6(b)(2) in NY and in Indiana, is a permissive rule.  “A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: (2) to prevent the client from committing a crime… and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services” (Ind. Rule).  NY’s Rule 1.6 does not have the “and in furtherance” language.  Indiana’s does which makes it even less likely that a disclosure would be appropriate even with the permissive disclosure language.

In NY the committee previously opined that past crimes cannot be revealed under this provision, only future crimes. Either way there is no mandatory disclosure, but a permissive disclosure in NY looks to be less risky than in Indiana, where there was no use of the lawyer’s services in furtherance of the misreporting.

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Jeffersonville INNS of Court meeting

Thursday March 21, Ted Waggoner will attend the Jeffersonville IN Inns of Court meeting at the invitation of Judge Terry Cody to speak on the Indiana Attorney Surrogate Rule, and its application to lawyers and law firms.  Ted chairs the Attorney Surrogate Rule Special Committee of the ISBA. 

Contact me for more information about this important rule.

IOLTA UPDATE if you accept Credit Cards: Circular 230 Disclosure: CBS Radio v. Emmis = DQ:

Credit Cards and IOLTA – New Problem

If you have been innovative over the past few years and started to accept credit card payments, and then posted them when required, directly to your IOLTA trust account (thanks Dan Reed and LawPay – a great ISBA member benefit) you better check your merchant account now.

Congress added Section 6050W to the code effective Jan 1, 2013.  As reported in LawBizzCoo, a legal business blog, there is a new requirement that if the credit card processor’s information is not exactly as contained in the IRS’s file (i.e. name change of firm, new address) the processor must withhold 28% of each deposit processed by the credit card company, including funds deposited in IOLTA.

The Disciplinary Commission may start getting notices of bounced checks from banks (required under the rules allowing banks to hold IOLTA funds) and lawyers may start getting certified letters from the Commission.  Those funds are not being mis-deposited, so you cannot just move them, they are held for potential taxes. You have to come up with the funds, and answer the grievance, in short order. Take a moment now and check your EIN letter and your Merchant Account Agreement. Fix it ASAP.

The same will happen to your general account, but that will not automatically involve the DC. It may later, but your landlord will not appreciate the rent check bouncing.

I discussed this with my office manager and she has been on top of it for a while, thanks to AffiniPay (a/k/a LawPay and Dan Reed). Whether you are with LawPay or some other provider, it is your skin in the game. Make sure everything lines up as it should.

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Tax abuse schemes are serious! Up to $190M serious for one lawyer.

The IRS issued one of its worst ideas a few years ago, called the Circular 230 Disclosure. Good in theory, to require lawyers to warn clients and potential clients not to construe information in a letter or email as being tax advice from the author to engage in a tax scheme, unless that is the purpose of the letter. Now a majority of lawyers’ posts of recipes or sports commentary carries a long disclaimer at the end that no client lacking an MBA could understand, and that most posters do not understand, or they would not prize their every utterance so highly!

But, sometimes folks should avoid doing what lawyers like Donna Guerin did, and review the tax code before writing tax schemes.

Ms. Guerin wrote a scheme so good she and her co-author claimed that her law firm’s clients could save millions of dollars in taxes. And she was no fly-by-night lawyer. A partner in the once prestigious BIG law firm Jenkins & Gilchrist, she recently pleaded guilt to criminal tax fraud, will go to prison for 8 years and has agreed to a penalty and restitution of $190 Million. Her partner entered his plea early and only has to pay $1.6 Million.

For my lawyer friends, be careful with the indiscriminate use of the Circular 230 language, and for the lawyers who do tax work, go back and read Circular 230 in-depth. Then be careful.

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Great fight, but Ice goes down.

Speaking last week on the Ethics of Developing and Representing Businesses, I was asked to discuss those lawyers who get disqualified from cases for overlooking and violating a Conflict of Interest. Rules 1.7 & 1.9 of the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct are pretty clear when lawyers must not violate the pledge of loyalty we take to our clients (see Comment 1 to RPC 1.7). But lawyers continue to lose focus of their duty, often when one engagement is completed and a chance to earn a new fee surfaces in a “new” case.

I have had the call on the Ethics Hotline (facts changed to protect the calling lawyers) where a previous client went to a new lawyer, with a similar problem, and the same or similar issues. The old lawyer gets in the case, deciding that things have changed since the first time these folks met. Then that old lawyer just hates getting the call or letter saying “I think you have a conflict and need to get out of the case.”  Take that call seriously!

One of Indy’s premiere big firms, Ice Miller was hired by Walter Berger, an employee of Emmis Broadcasting Co., to help him in a senior management employment contract in 2002. Emmis had suggested Ice Miller to Berger. In 2005 Berger renewed that contract with Emmis, then several months later left Emmis to go to work for CBS Radio, Inc. Emmis did not like that, hired their lawyers, Another of Indy’s top big firms, Barnes & Thornburg to sue CBS for hiring Berger, (USDC, So. IN, Case No. 1:06-cv-0920) then it discharged B&T and hired Ice Miller to represent it in the case.

Ice shows up in the suit, and CBS and Berger demand it get out of the case due to an alleged conflict of interest. Ice, showing an incredible amount of chutzpah, lashed back with several defenses and a couple of accusations (which to an outsider read like they were based on client confidences), including that there is no conflict because “it is clear” that Berger breached the Emmis contract. The facts and issues were well briefed by both sides (materials in the ICLEF book) and Federal Judge Larry J. McKinney wrote a great explanation of the tests and the considerations involved in a DQ motion, in his 14 page Order. It is available on Pacer, or through Westlaw($$$).

Bottom line, loyalty is paramount, the issues are looked at from the client’s POV, and while case dicta and commentary makes it sound tough for the clients to prevail, in reality it is hard for a lawyer to win on this issue. There are a few outlier cases, but from my study, the issue, once raised, should be seen in the practical light of “how much is it worth to fight this issue, plus the possible ethics complaint, if you win? Is there enough in the case to pay all that?”  After looking at that, you should consider the option to prepare that Motion to Withdraw and have a talk with your now ex-client.

IN Re: Kendall Redux

Kendall – Redux

The 2004 case of In Re Michael Kendall (see 3-24-04 entry) is a landmark case among Indiana’s legal fee cases.

Kendall’s law firm went bankrupt, and several clients’ fees could not be refunded, having been deposited into his general account. The issue was whether those funds should have been safe in a trust account. In a 13 page opinion. the Supreme Court expounded on the proper use of “flat fees” “non-refundable retainers” and how lawyers can protect their livelihoods.

The hearing officer had found violations of Rule 1.4 on communicating with clients, but on the big fee issues, Rules 1.5 & 1.15, found no violation.  The Disciplinary Commission appealed those findings, and the Supreme Court found there were violations of Rules 1.5, & 1.15. The court distinguished Kendall’s actions from those found in the In the Matter of Stanton case, when flat fees for criminal matters, deposited in the lawyer’s general account was permissible. Kendall deposited advance fees for hourly work in the lawyer’s general account.

FLAT FEES

The court’s discussion starts with a helpful paragraph:  Advance fee payments are subject to different requirements, depending upon the terms of the agreement between the lawyer and the client.  This discussion will distinguish between the advance fees charged by the respondent here (that were to be earned in the future at an agreed rate) and advance fees that are agreed to cover specific legal services regardless of length or complexity (fixed or “flat” fees). 

After the discussion the Court held: “We therefore hold that Prof. Cond. R. 1.15(a) generally requires the segregation of advance payments of attorney fees, as discussed below….  Except in the case of flat fees governed by Stanton, a lawyer’s failure to place advance payments of attorney fees in a separate account violates this rule.”

The per curiam opinion, authored by now Chief Justice Dickson, defined a “flat fee” that could be charged, and once collected placed in the firm’s general account, as follows: “As distinguished from a partial initial payment to be applied to fees for future legal services, a flat fee is a fixed fee that an attorney charges for all legal services in a particular matter, or for a particular discrete component of legal services.”

Are you paying attention reader? Flat fees can be charged and put in the general office account.  But they must qualify as flat fees.  And you must explain, accurately, how that works, so the client is not misled.

UNREASONABLE FEES = NON-REFUNDABLE RETAINERS?

Kendall’s other mistake was to use language in his fee agreement that must have been common (considering how often the issue arises), a provision that fees paid were non-refundable unless otherwise provided by law.  That language is a huge red-flag, and while the Supreme Court has not yet said the term “non-refundable retainer” is forbidden, they have not approved it in recent history when addressing the situation.  In Kendall they held that even though the Commission never proved he had taken and kept a non-refundable retainer, and never failed to resolve a retainer when he was discharged before the completion of the case, the Court  still found the fee agreement that included a threat that the fees paid could not be refunded was unreasonable and in violation of Rule 1.5.

In language that I still find confusing, the court said the following two things: 1) “In discussing [in Thonert] the nonrefundability provision, we observed: We do not hold that unrefundable retainers are per se unenforceable.  There are many circumstances where, for example, preclusion of other representations or guaranteed priority of access to an attorney’s advice may justify such an arrangement.  But here there is no evidence of, for example, any value received by the client or detriment incurred by the attorney in return for the nonrefundable provision, other than relatively routine legal services.  [Thonert] 682 N.E.2d at 524.  Where a retainer is thus justified, a lawyer would be well advised to explicitly include the basis for such non-refundability in the attorney-client agreement; and 2) We hold that the assertion in an attorney fee agreement that such advance payment is nonrefundable violates the requirement  of Prof. Cond. R. 1.5(a) that a lawyer’s fee “shall be reasonable.”

How clear is that? The non-refundable retainer fee may be permissible, but to say so in the fee agreement violates the reasonable fees requirement.

Word that part of your fee agreement carefully, yet make it clear for the average client.

And remember, even though the Court did not say it out loud, no fee is Non-Refundable.

CONCLUSION

Michael C. Kendall, in the face of other undisclosed charges recently filed by the Disciplinary Commission, tendered his resignation of his license to practice law. On Jan. 28, 2013 the Supreme Court accepted his resignation, and said that he may not apply for reinstatement for at least five years.

I don’t know Michael C. Kendall, but the 2004 opinion included the following paragraph: The hearing officer received significant evidence of Kendall’s professional reputation.  Several highly respected witnesses testified favorably for Kendall, praising his history of ethical practice, his integrity, his significant public service, and his strong dedication, care, and commitment to his clients’ cases.  The hearing officer recognized that Kendall “deserves sanction” but noted that the “accolades from the various witnesses were impressive and unchallenged,” and urged that “the penalty needs to be tempered by what seems to be the Respondent’s superior ethical history until this recent period.”  Findings at 23. 

A few years ago a friend of mine had some troubles, and got a reprimand. Folks tried to help, but a second round of complaints hit. He resigned his license to practice as a lawyer. It was right for him. I hope this was right for Kendall.

Stay Up on the Rules; Trust Account is for Client Funds; How Much is Take Home Anyway?

Ten New Rules
Indiana Supreme Court has amended ten of the Rules lawyers need to know effective Jan. 1, 2013.  You can review them here and realize that service of pleadings on fellow lawyers is now permissible through email, if agreed. PDF format becomes a standard, and several changes to the RPC, including Rule 5.5 on cross-state practice will go into effect.

If you don’t take the occasion to read the various rules that affect your profession, and you life as a lawyer, you have several days in the next two weeks to take that opportunity. Out of the office, often with a book in hand, you might choose to make that book (or tablet) the Rules of Court, and the link above to make sure you are reading the most current rules.

And for a kick, read the Administrative Rules (you may skip the details of Rule 7(d), 8(b), and App to Rule 1 – unless you are a judge) and the Admission and Discipline Rules, in addition to the RPC.  Finish by going back and reading Rule 22 of the A&D Rules. That is the Oath of Attorneys. You took that oath when you were admitted (you might have a copy on your wall someplace), and you would have repeated it if you attended an Indiana Bar Foundation Fellows dinner. At the dinner a Supreme Court Justice leads the crowd in a recitation of the Oath.  A good moment for all in attendance.

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YEAR END TRUST ACCOUNT ALERT

Year end temptations get to some lawyers, the temptation to leave earned funds in the trust account a few weeks longer to move income into next year.  You may want to read the opinion: In the Matter of Jacob Dunnick.

Dunnick was trying to avoid having an IRS lien enforced, and so he started operating his office general funds and paying his office bills out of his trust account. He wrote a check to the Commission for Continuing Legal Education out the funds in his trust account, and the Commission reported him under Rule 8.3. A couple of months later Dunnick bounced a check on the trust account, and under the IOLTA Rule (1.15), that is an automatic report to the DC from the depositor bank.

For playing with his trust funds like this, Dunnick gets a real 60 day suspension (six months, stayed, 60 days served, one year probation). He will need to work with a CPA to quarterly audit and report the trust account to the DC, and he must take the Trust Fund Management class.

Prior lawyer-clients of mine have reported that the Trust Fund Management class is quite worthwhile. If you are uncertain about the means and methods of handling the trust funds or other property that you obtain from your clients, you should keep an eye out for the class. Or you might buy and read the classical treatise on the issue “The ABA Guide to Lawyer Trust Accounts” available through Amazon or the ABA (where you will be surprised to find the price is about 1/2 the Amazon price, and there is $10 off if you belong to the LPM Section).

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Finances causing Troubles?

I ran across an interesting article on Inc.com’s website.  Maybe it fits your needs, maybe it does not, but I know many lawyers who suffer from the problem of inadequate fees, and I have spoken about the issue at the ISBA SSF Conference in years past.

“You Don’t Charge Enough. Here’s How to Fix That.” tackles a problem that affects many lawyers, we let the jokes and the reputation as sharks keep our fees too far below the value that our services provide to our clients. A worthwhile read before you set your office budget for 2013.

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And on that note, I want to wish you the best of the holidays.  As noted Indiana lawyer Derrick Wilson said “Make sure you wish the readers a Merry Christmas, Happy Hanukkah, Kwanzaa, Festivus or holiday of their choice.”  And so I do (once again, following the sage advice of Mr. Wilson…)