Exonerated in a Discipline Case, and Good Explanation by the Court – a Two-fer
First it is good to see the Court side with a respondent on occasion. Robert Canada got a ruling in his favor, and on that gave a solid explanation of why. And while the court did not say so, exactly, it seems it implemented the Realtors’ Rule.
What is the Realtors’ Rule, you ask? When a realtor is trying to sell a property under listing, the seller cannot just walk away when there is a buyer. The rule is if the real estate agent (I know Realtor® is a registered trademark of the NAR) produces a ready, willing and able buyer who makes a bona fide offer at or above the listing price (or a price the seller later sells for), the realtor has earned the full commission, and the fact that the seller refuses to complete the sale does not mean that the seller does not have to pay the realtor.
Canada offered to “get a plea” in a Class A Felony drug case in exchange for a fee of $10,000. That is what the client asked for, and what the lawyer agreed to do. He worked out a plea, the client was happy, and agreed that it was a good plea, then before entering the plea, the client changed lawyers “to get a better deal.” New lawyer got the defendant the same deal that Canada had worked out. The client demanded a refund since Canada had not “earned the fee.”
There was a written fee agreement and the court looked it over carefully. The agreement contained the toxic words “fee is non-refundable” which is a big red flag for the Commission and the Court. Here, although the court said there were qualifiers to the refund that were not appropriate in a flat fee agreement (possibility of preclusion of other representation and accessibility guaranteed), in this case, and because Canada had completed the task he agreed to perform, the fee was fully earned as the plea was obtained, even if the defendant did not accept it the first time. The red flag caused the review, but did not spell trouble – this time.
Canada estimated that he had spent 20 hours on the case, which did not seem to factor into the opinion. In other words, as a flat fee case, the court did not retroactively do an hourly fee analysis (divide the fee by the hours to see if the resulting rate “shocked the consciences” of the judges. Nor should they.
Copy the following language, and imprint it on your minds, consciences, and the file folder where your form fee agreements rest:
Discussion: This Court has addressed fee agreements in Matter of O’Farrell, 942 N.E.2d 799 (Ind. 2011), Matter of Kendall, 804 N.E.2d 1152 (Ind. 2004), and Matter of Thonert, 682 N.E.2d 522 (Ind. 1997). Under the guidance provided by these opinions, we conclude that the fee Respondent charged in this case was a permissible flat fee (notwithstanding the fee agreement’s one sentence mentioning possible preclusion of other representation and guaranty of priority of access, which would have been more relevant if the fee were a general retainer). Moreover, the agreement properly advised Client that a refund was possible in the event of a failure to perform the agreed legal services. See Kendall, 804 N.E.2d at 1160. The hearing officer found the amount of the flat fee to be reasonable. We therefore find no infirmity with the fee agreement itself.
If you are looking into the use of flat fee agreements with clients (not to be confused with menu pricing agreements) pay close attention. I disagree that the preclusion issue or the guaranty of access are more properly for a general retainer, as taking a drug case often precludes other drug cases due to the conflict of interest rules, and guaranteed prompt access is always a premium item, and should not generally be given away. Nevertheless, it is a helpful opinion.
As one who tells lawyers never to use the words “fee” and “nonrefundable” in the same paragraph, let alone sentence, I partially retract that. But I still urge extreme caution. You may get the Canada treatment.
Mr. Canada, sorry you went through this, but your case improves the profession’s understanding on how to write flat fee agreements, and you were exonerated. Thank you.
Big Time Aggressive Tactics Backfire Big Time
Gordon B. Dempsey takes no prisoners in litigation, at least in the cases where he is a party. The facts are pretty simple, buy an apartment building, don’t pay the payments, you get sued. In 2002 the foreclosure of his apartment building was ordered, and then his chapter 13 bankruptcy stayed the sale. The convoluted facts get worse, and you can read them here. Eventually, and after the parties “settled the suit” in 2008, Dempsey went on the attack again.
He seemed to have a concern with Jewish people, and with lawyers who might be Jewish. The court findings were:
… that Respondent violated these Indiana Professional Conduct Rules prohibiting the following misconduct:
3.1: Asserting a position for which there is no non-frivolous basis in law or fact.
4.4: Using means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person.
8.4(g): Engaging in conduct that was not legitimate advocacy, in a professional capacity, manifesting bias or prejudice based upon race, religion, and disability (mental condition).
The penalty section discusses Dempsey’s history of “unethical litigation practices” “virulent bigotry” as possibly enough of a reason for disbarment, but holds back from that. He got a three-year suspension without automatic reinstatement.
Automatic Reinstatement: What does it mean to get, or not get Automatic Reinstatement?
Disciplinary Commission staff lawyer Bob Shook, former prosecutor in Johnson County, explained the importance of getting automatic reinstatement at the Fulton County Bar Outing CLE a couple of years ago. Admission and Discipline Rule 23, § 4 covers reinstatement. It says:
A person who has been suspended from the practice of law may petition for reinstatement when the term of suspension prescribed in the order of suspension has elapsed. … If costs have been imposed as part of an order of suspension or an order accepting an affidavit of resignation, those costs must be paid before a petition for reinstatement is filed.
(b) A petition for reinstatement may be granted if the petitioner establishes by clear and convincing evidence before the disciplinary commission of this Court that:
(1) The petitioner desires in good faith to obtain restoration of his or her privilege to practice law;
(2) The petitioner has not practiced law in this State or attempted to do so since he or she was disciplined;
(3) The petitioner has complied fully with the terms of the order for discipline;
(4) The petitioner’s attitude towards the misconduct for which he or she was disciplined is one of genuine remorse;
(5) The petitioner’s conduct since the discipline was imposed has been exemplary and above reproach;
(6) The petitioner has a proper understanding of and attitude towards the standards that are imposed upon members of the bar and will conduct himself or herself in conformity with such standards;
(7) The petitioner can safely be recommended to the legal profession, the courts and the public as a person fit to be consulted by others and to represent them and otherwise act in matters of trust and confidence, and in general to aid in the administration of justice as a member of the bar and an officer of the Courts;
(8) The disability has been removed, if the discipline was imposed by reason of physical or mental illness or infirmity, or for use of or addiction to intoxicants or drugs;
(9) The petitioner has taken the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) within six (6) months before or after the date the petition for reinstatement is filed and passed with a scaled score of eighty (80) or above.
So, you have to show remorse, comply with the order, and take the MPRE and score an 80 or above. That means you have to go back and seriously study ethics in detail.
According to what I recall Shook saying, the process for reinstatement usually will add about 9 months to the end of a suspension. That means when you read disciplinary opinions found here, the words about reinstatement may mean the difference between functional disbarment and not.